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ABSTRACT
Recent debate has identified important gaps in the understanding of intertemporal risks. Critical 
to closing these gaps is evidence on which dimension of intertemporal risk – the risk or the time – 
is evaluated first. Though under discounted expected utility this ordering is of no consequence, 
under discounted non-expected utility models the order of evaluation is critical. We provide 
experimental tests in which different orderings of evaluation generate different predictions for 
behavior. We find more support for the notion that the risk dimension is evaluated first.
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1 Introduction
The ability to use the same utility representation for both risk and time preferences has been
a defining element of the classic model of Discounted Expected Utility (DEU). This quality,
which derives from the assumptions of separability of preferences across time and linearity in
probability (the Independence Axiom), has been a key convenience of the model as it implies
that desires to smooth consumptions across time and states of nature can be handled symmet-
rically (see, among others, Hall, 1988; Epstein and Zin, 1991). This feature has also been the
focus of a number of important generalizations of DEU (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and
Zin, 1989; Chew and Epstein, 1989; Epstein and Zin, 1991).
In a recent experimental contribution published in this journal, Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) present subjects with intertemporal decisions where experimental payments are sub-
ject to independent risks over time. Their carefully constructed prospects exposed subjects’
systematic violations of the DEU assumption that risk preferences and time preferences are
interchangeable.1 Moreover, they go on to claim that their findings are also inconsistent with a
number of non-expected utility alternatives, including discounted Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).2
1When allocating a budget across a sooner and a later payment with 100% payment probability, subjects’
behavior is substantially di↵erent than when each payment will be received with an independent 50% chance,
despite the common ratio of payment probabilities. Under DEU, allocating across a sooner and later payment,
c1 and c2, each received with corresponding payment probability p1 and p2, subject to intertemporal budget
constraint c1 + (1 + r) · c2 = m yields intertemporal Euler equation
u
0(c1)
D(1, 2) · u0(c2)
=
✓
p1
p2
◆
·
1
1 + r
,
where u(·) is a stationary instantaneous utility function and D(1, 2) captures discounting between periods 1
and 2. Consider the two conditons (p1, p2) = (1, 1) and (p1, p2) = (0.5, 0.5). Given p1/p2 is identical, the
corresponding Euler equations and allocation behavior should be identical across these conditions. Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012) show that individuals allocate more of their budget to the certain c1 relative to the common
ratio counterpart when r is low and less of their budget to the certain c1 when r is high. This cross-over in
demand has been reproduced by Miao and Zhong (2015); Cheung (2015) and became the central point of
discussion in Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015); Miao and Zhong (2015); Cheung (2015).
2A critical component of the CPT model is the assumption of a non-linear probability weighting function,
⇡(p), rather than than the DEU model’s assumption of linearity in probabilities. Even with this adjustment,
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) show the Euler equations in the two conditions (p1, p2) = (1, 1) and (p1, p2) =
(0.5, 0.5) remain the same because ⇡(1)⇡(1) =
⇡(0.5)
⇡(0.5) = 1. This statement implicitly assumed that CPT is applied
atemporally within each period (i.e., a ‘risk-first’ evaluation of the temporal risk).
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After the publication of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), this journal also published three
comments noting potential alternative non-DEU rationalizations of the findings: Miao and
Zhong (2015), Cheung (2015) and Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015). Andreoni and Sprenger (2015)
replied to Miao and Zhong (2015) and Cheung (2015), acknowledging the general value in their
arguments, even though they do not apply to the circumstances of the experiment.3 However,
to fully and fairly examine the very complex and thoughtful hypothesis suggested in the third
comment, by Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015), a full experimental test of their unique hypothesis
was required. This is the subject of this note.
Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) argue the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) findings may be ra-
tionalized by CPT if, rather than applying CPT atemporally within each period, as Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012) do, one applies the model across periods.4 This construction of CPT by
Epper and Fehr-Duda is novel. Interestingly, the Epper-Fehr-Duda interpretation of intertem-
poral CPT was not considered or suggested for other prominent intertemporal applications of
CPT, such as income targeting (e.g., Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and Thaler, 1997; Fehr
and Goette, 2007) and myopic loss aversion (e.g., Gneezy and Potters, 1997), whose conceptions
of intertemporal CPT are consistent with Andreoni and Sprenger’s.5 As a consequence, Epper
3Miao and Zhong (2015) and Cheung (2015), propose functional forms in the spirit of models with preferences
for the resolution of uncertainty (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989; Chew and Epstein, 1989;
Epstein and Zin, 1991) wherein the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coe cient of relative risk
aversion are governed by di↵erent parameters to rationalize the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) deviations from
DEU. As noted in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2015), the majority of models
sitting in the above classes of preferences reduce to expected utility when uncertainty is resolved immediately
(Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989). Given that all uncertainty in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
was resolved at the end of the experiment, this leaves the researcher in a position of applying the functional
forms without the underlying assumptions being satisfied. This point notwithstanding, parametric formulations
with assumed di↵erences between risk preferences and time preferences can indeed rationalize the observed
findings.
4If, instead of applying CPT within period, one applies it across periods, then the two conditions noted
in footnote 2 above are qualitatively di↵erent. Though in the (p1, p2) = (1, 1) condition only one stream of
outcomes can be realized, in the (p1, p2) = (0.5, 0.5) condition, four potential streams exist. The potential
streams of outcomes are {(c1, c2), (c1, 0), (0, c2), (0, 0)} with corresponding probabilities {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25}.
Note, that the ordinal preference ranking of these streams and, hence, the cumulative distribution of streams
of outcomes will depend on time preferences and on individual allocations. At low values of r, (c1, 0) is likely
to ranked above (0, c2), while at high values of r, the opposite ranking should exist. Given this change in the
rankings and corresponding change to the cumulative distribution of streams, one may observe the cross-over
in demand observed in the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) data.
5 The cab drivers of Camerer et al. (1997) are assumed to view each day’s labor market decisions in isolation
and the framing e↵ects associated with myopic loss aversion have at their core an implicit assumption that
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and Fehr-Duda’s hypothesis represents a potentially important realignment of the literature
on intertemporal applications of CPT. CPT’s intertemporal predictions depend on whether
temporal risks are perceived as a stream of prospects (‘risk-first’ evaluation, as in Andreoni
and Sprenger), or a prospect of streams (‘time-first’ evaluation).6 It is critical to know which
ordering is more consistent with actual behavior.
We present an experiment where, under CPT, behavior is predicted to di↵er depending on
whether evaluation is risk-first or time-first. Our design carries the intuition of the following
thought experiment. Consider the decision between two prospects: Prospect S (for safe) is
certainty of $10 paid in a week; and Prospect R (for risky) is a 50% chance of $20 paid in a
week. If both options were composed with a common, independent 90% chance of $19 paid in
four weeks, would the initial choices be revised? Under CPT, it depends on whether the time
dimension or the risk dimension is evaluated first.
To evaluate the value of choosing the Prospect R under risk-first we apply CPT twice,
once in one week over outcomes $20 and $0, and again in four weeks over outcomes $19 and
$0. Because of time separability of the independent gambles, modulo wealth e↵ects, the latter
prospect is of no consequence to the earlier choice.
In contrast, under time-first the evaluation of Prospect R applies CPT only once over four
streams of outcomes: ($20,$19), ($20,$0), ($0,$19), and ($0,$0), where ($x, $y) refers to $x in
one week and $y in four weeks. These streams arise with probabilities 0.45, 0.05, 0.45, and 0.05,
respectively. Adding the chance of $19 in four weeks has a discernible e↵ect on behavior. The
decisionmaker must consider the 45% chance of a stream better than the prior best outcome of
$20, and the 95% chance of a stream better than the prior worst outcome of $0. Similarly for
evaluating Prospect S the deicisionmaker evaluates two streams, ($10,$19) and ($10,$0), with
without explicit bracketing provided by the experimenter, people will evaluate each period’s risk in isolation.
6From a normative perspective, both evaluations are consistent with first order stochastic dominance for
probability distributions over streams of outcomes. However, when examining a more restrictive notion of con-
sistency, defined as ordinal stochastic dominance (OSD), only the ‘time-first’ formulation satisfies this stronger
criterion. Though this may provide some normative appeal for the time-first formulation, it is critical to exam-
ine in a simple setting which formulation provides a more compelling account of intertemporal risky choice. A
rigorous treatment of OSD appears in section A.2.
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a 90% chance of a stream better than the prior best (and worst) outcome of $10.
Ultimately the new decision between Prospects S and R under the time-first model is arbi-
trated by a CPT probability weighting function. The central question is whether the di↵erence
between 45% and the prior best outcome probability of 50% is larger or smaller than the dif-
ference between 90% and 95%. Almost all probability weighting functions proposed in the
literature have features of convexity at high probabilities, such that one would expect the dif-
ference between 90% and 95% to be larger than between 45% and 50%. Figure 1 provides
graphical illustration for the canonical model of probability weighting associated with Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992). Prospect R benefits from the fact that increasing high cumulative
probabilities a↵ects utility more than increasing moderate cumulative probabilities. Hence, a
time-first Tversky and Kahneman (1992) decisionmaker who is indi↵erent to Prospects S and
R in isolation would strictly prefer risky Prospect R when adding a common 90% chance of $19
in four weeks.
Figure 1 highlights the importance of the probabilities associated with common future risks.
Most weighting functions are also formulated with concavity at lower probabilities. If the
decision between Prospect S and R was taken with a common 10% chance of $19 in four weeks,
the time-first prediction could di↵er. The calculus then depends upon whether the di↵erence
between 5% and 10% is larger or smaller than the di↵erence between 50% and 55%. Here
Prospect S benefits from the fact that increasing low cumulative probabilities a↵ects utility
more than increasing moderate probabilities. Hence, a time-first Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
decisionmaker who is indi↵erent to Prospects S and R in isolation would strictly prefer safe
Prospect S when adding a common 10% chance of $19 in four weeks. Section 2 and Appendix
1 provide more specific detail and generality.
We treat such kinds of questions as tests of a simple property we call Common Future
Risk Invariance (CFRI). Whereas the risk-first formulation requires invariance to independent
common future risks, the time-first formulation both allows and qualitatively predicts violations
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Notes: Figure provides standard probability weighting formulation from Tversky and Kahneman (1992), ⇡(p) =
p
 
/(p  + (1   p) )1/  and   = 0.61, with both concave and convex regions. For a time-first decisionmaker
indi↵erent between a safe Prospect S, certainty of $10 paid in a week, and a risky Prospect R, a 50% chance
of $20 paid a week, the e↵ect of adding a common 90% (10%) chance of $19 in four weeks is illustrated in red
(blue). If ⇡(0.95) ⇡(0.9) > ⇡(0.5) ⇡(0.45), the time-first decisionmaker will strictly prefer the risky Prospect
R when adding a common 90% chance of $19 in four weeks. If ⇡(0.1) ⇡(0.05) > ⇡(0.55) ⇡(0.5), the time-first
decisionmaker will strictly prefer the safe Prospect S when adding a common 10% chance of $19 of four weeks.
Both deviations would be predicted by the illustrated weighting function.
Figure 1: Probability Distortions and Time-First Behavior
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of this property.7
In a sample of 144 undergraduate subjects, we provide within-subject tests of adherence to
CFRI, and hence on the order of evaluation in risky temporal choice. Subjects state preferences
over two gambles with common, independent future risks. Across tasks, the common future
risks are varied both in payment value and in probability.
In addition to testing CFRI, we also confirm that our subjects reproduce the standard
findings consistent with CPT probability weighting in an atemporal setting. If indeed the
Epper–Fehr-Duda interpretation of CPT is correct, this allows us to make predictions with
respect to the CFRI violations; we can forecast their number and sign (greater or lesser risk
aversion). From these findings, we predict 70 percent of our subjects should violate CFRI in
predictable directions under time-first CPT. Of course, under the risk-first formulation, as well
as with DEU, there should be no (systematic or predictable) violations of CFRI.
Violations of CFRI are found in roughly 50 percent of cases in our baseline design. The
direction of actual violations is unpredictable, symmetric, and concurring with the prediction
of the time-first model at about the rate of chance. Lacking a case for the time-first model,
we ask whether the data could be consistent with a formulation of noisy risk-first evaluation.
This interpretation is supported by an additional element in our design for which the time-first
model predicts e↵ectively no violations of invariance. Nonetheless, violations remain around 50
percent, and remain quite unpredictable relative to the time-first model. As well, the risk-first
prediction for behavior generally outperforms the time-first prediction, and particularly when
the latter predicts violations of CFRI. Robustness tests assure that the evaluation of risk and
time is driving behavior, and not a heuristic of eliminating common decision elements.
Together these data indicate that when risk and time are intertwined, independent risks
across periods are evaluated largely in separation. In addition to yielding insights for the
interpretation of experimental data, these findings also provide guidance on the application of
7We view this invariance property as being relevant only for prospects with insignificant wealth e↵ects.
If increased probabilistic wealth in the future were to alter the extent of risk taking due to expectations of
diminishing marginal utility, even DEU models would yield violations of CFRI.
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non-expected utility models in temporal settings. The findings suggest a simple and analytically
tractable approach to application when risks are independent. If independent distributions
across periods are evaluated separately, then researchers may safely restrict attention only to
the periods of interest, assuming that exogenous future risks do not overly influence current
choice. This is indeed the assumption that much of the prospect theory literature has implicitly
or explicitly invoked to date, as noted above. Such a restriction also disciplines the predictions
of CPT through time. As we show, in the time-first application of CPT, changes to common
future risks can lead to increased or decreased risk taking, leading many patterns of behavior
to be consistent with the model, provided an appropriate formulation of future risks.8
Readers who are content with the intuitions provided above may wish to skip section 2 on
the detailed theoretical development, going directly to section 3 on experimental procedures.
Section 4 provides the results of our experiment and section 5 is a conclusion.
2 Theoretical Consideration
Consider a prospect, (p,x), paying outcomes x = {x1, x2, ..., xN} with probabilities p =
{p1, p2, ..., pN};
PN
i=1 pi = 1. Assume that x is a ranked list of gains, relative to reference
point r   0, x1   x2   ...   xN   r.9 The CPT utility value for (p,x) is
U(p,x) =
NX
i=1
 
⇡(
X
ji
pj)   ⇡(
X
j<i
pj)
!
u(xi|r),
8The above conclusions are contingent upon wishing to retain the general CPT formulation for risky choice.
We provide additional robustness tests implementing common risks within a single period wherein both CPT
formulations predict sensitivities. These data highlight general shortcomings in the atemporal predictions of
CPT, echoing the recent findings of failures of CPT rank dependence from Bernheim and Sprenger (2017), which
may militate for alternative risky choice formulations. Further, even though the data here are supportive of risk-
first evaluation, this formulation is clearly rejected by the findings of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Resolving
these apparent inconsistencies and making positive progress towards more descriptive models of choice in risk
over time are important future steps.
9Under the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumptions, deviations from the reference point — the origin in
their formulation — result in both di↵erences in the weighting function and the utility function. Most significant
in their formulation is the larger slope in the area below the reference point, when compared to the area above,
which induces the kink normally identified as loss aversion. Additional assumptions usually include convexity
below the reference point and concavity above the reference point.
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where u(xi|r) is reference dependent utility, and ⇡(·) is a non-linear probability distortion
function acting on cumulative probabilities. When the outcomes x are atemporal payments,
the application of CPT is straightforward. However, when choices involve both time and risk,
the application depends on the order of evaluation of risks through time.10
Risk-First Evaluation: Consider a CPT decision-maker who faces independent temporal
risks and first evaluates each period’s distribution of outcomes. Then, in each period, t, there
exists a prospect consisting of a set of outcomes, xt = {x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t}, received with probabil-
ities pt = {p1,t, p2,t, ..., pN,t};
PN
i=1 pi,t = 1. When faced with a finite stream of such prospects
from t = 0 to t = T , the decision-maker’s utility is
TX
t=0
 
NX
i=1
 
⇡(
X
ji
pj,t)   ⇡(
X
j<i
pj,t)
!
 
t
u(xi,t|rt)
!
,
where rt is the reference point in each period.
Time-First Evaluation: Consider a CPT decision-maker who faces temporal risks and first
evaluates each stream of outcomes. In this case, there exists only one prospect (p,X), where
the elements of X = {x1,x2, ...,xM} are distinct streams of outcomes, {x0, x1, ..., xT}, which
are ordered by their time preference ranking. For example, x1 = argmax
X
PT
t=0  
t
u(xt|rt). The
elements of p = {p1, p2, ..., pM};
PM
i=1 pi = 1 are the probabilities with which these streams
arise. Such a time-first evaluation yields a prospect of streams with utility
MX
i=1
 
⇡(
X
ji
pj)   ⇡(
X
j<i
pj)
! 
TX
t=0
 
t
u(xi,t|rt)
!
.
Depending on the order of evaluation, decision-makers should be di↵erentially sensitive to
the addition of common future risks. We are specifically interested in the e↵ect of independent
common future risks. Consider a prospect, (p
t
,x
t
), paying one of N outcomes in period t
10In order to focus on the deviations from neoclassical foundations introduced by CPT, our analysis of
discounting maintains the benchmark model of exponential discounting (Samuelson, 1937). The conclusions
we draw would be maintained under behavioral alternatives to this benchmark such as hyperbolic or quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Our design postpones all payments to
ensure that immediacy has no additional e↵ect on choice.
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alone, xt = {x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t}, with probabilities pt = {p1,t, p2,t, ..., pN,t};
PN
i=1 pi,t = 1. Let
(p
t
,x
t
) + (q
s
,x
s
) represent the composition of prospect (p
t
,x
t
), with outcomes at time t, and
independent prospect (q
s
,x
s
), with outcomes at time s > t.
For a preference relation on such prospects, ⌫, we o↵er the following definition:
Definition Common Future Risk Invariance. A binary preference relation, ⌫, exhibits Com-
mon Future Risk Invariance (CFRI) if the preference
(p
t
,x
t
) ⌫ (p0
t
,x0
t
)
implies
(p
t
,x
t
) + (q
s
,x
s
) ⌫ (p0
t
,x0
t
) + (q
s
,x
s
)
for all independent future risks (q
s
,x
s
) in all future periods s > t.
The risk-first and time-first CPT formulations di↵erentially respect CFRI. The intuition is
straightforward. Whereas a risk-first decision-maker considers the stream of prospects (p
t
,x
t
)
and (q
s
,x
s
) separately through time, the time-first decision-maker evaluates the prospect over
streams arrived at by the product of (p
t
,x
t
) and (q
s
,x
s
).
Consider a decisionmaker facing the choices in our introductory thought experiment, who is
indi↵erent between Prospect S, certainty of $10 paid in a week, and Prospect R, a 50% chance
of $20 paid a week. The CPT representation of this indi↵erence is
 
1
u(101|r1) =  
1[⇡(0.5)u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(0.5))u(01|r1)]. (1)
Composing these choices with a common 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks leads to
our two possible representations. Under the risk-first model, the stream of prospects in the new
9
choice are again indi↵erent as
 
1
u(101|r1) + 4 (⇡(0.9)u(194|r4) + (1   ⇡(0.9))u(04|r4)) =
 
1 (⇡(0.5)u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(0.5))u(01|r1)) + 4 (⇡(0.9)u(194|r4) + (1   ⇡(0.9))u(04|r4))
reduces to the original equality of (1). In contrast, under the time-first model, the choice
requires evaluation of new prospects over ranked streams. For Prospect S, the ranking of
streams is x1 = {101, 194}, x2 = {101, 04}, which arise with probabilities p = {0.9, 0.1}. The
corresponding utility is
⇡(0.9)
 
 
1
u(101|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.9))
 
 
1
u(101|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
,
or
⇡(0.9) 1u(101|r1) +
⇡(0.9)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.9))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
.
For Prospect R, the ranking of streams is x1 = {201, 194}, x2 = {201, 04}, x3 = {01, 194},
x4 = {01, 04}, which arise with probabilities p = {0.45, 0.05, 0.45, 0.05}. The corresponding
utility is
⇡(0.45)
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (⇡(0.5)   ⇡(0.45))
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
+
(⇡(0.95)   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.95))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
,
or
(⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(201|r1)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(01|r1))
 
+
(⇡(0.95) + ⇡(0.45)   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   (⇡(0.95) + ⇡(0.45)   ⇡(0.5)))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
.
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Recalling the indi↵erence from (1), the individual can only remain indi↵erent if
⇡(0.9)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.9))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
=
(⇡(0.95) + ⇡(0.45)   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   (⇡(0.95) + ⇡(0.45)   ⇡(0.5)))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
,
or
⇡(0.95)   ⇡(0.9) = ⇡(0.5)   ⇡(0.45).
Most probability weighting functions, such as that illustrated in Figure 1 have regions of convex-
ity ranging from moderate to high probabilities. Such a condition would imply the di↵erence
between ⇡(0.95) and ⇡(0.9) is larger than that between ⇡(0.5) and ⇡(0.45). Under such a
condition, the individual will prefer Prospect R, growing apparently more risk tolerant under
composition with the common future risk.
Importantly, whether common future risk leads to more or less risk tolerance depends upon
the relevant probabilities. Consider instead the common future risk being only a 10% chance of
receiving $19 in four weeks. The potential streams and their ranking remains identical for both
options, yet the probabilities with which they arise now changes.11 Now, the decisionmaker
11 For Prospect S, the ranking of streams remains x1 = {101, 194}, x2 = {101, 04}, which now arise with
probabilities p = {0.1, 0.9}. The corresponding utility is
⇡(0.1)
 
 
1
u(101|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.1))
 
 
1
u(101|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
.
For Prospect R, the ranking of streams remains x1 = {201, 194}, x2 = {201, 04}, x3 = {01, 194}, x4 = {01, 04},
which arise with probabilities p = {0.05, 0.45, 0.05, 0.45}. The corresponding utility is
⇡(0.05)
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (⇡(0.5)   ⇡(0.05))
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
+
(⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.55))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
.
Indii↵erence requires
 
1
u(101|r1) +
⇡(0.1)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.1))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
=
(⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(201|r1)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.5))
 
 
1
u(01|r1)
 
+
⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) + ⇡(0.05)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   (⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) + ⇡(0.05)))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
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will remain indi↵erent if
⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) = ⇡(0.1)   ⇡(0.05).
Most parameterizations of CPT with S -shaped weighting have regions of concavity from low to
moderate probabilities. Such a condition would imply the di↵erence between ⇡(0.55) and ⇡(0.5)
is smaller than that between ⇡(0.1) and ⇡(0.05). Under such a condition, the individual will
prefer Prospect S, growing apparently more risk averse under composition with the common
future risk.
In addition to being sensitive to the probabilities of common future risks, violations of in-
variance will also be sensitive to the initial probabilities associated with each option. Appendix
A.1 provides detailed intuition and simulations evaluating CFRI violations in our experimen-
tal environment. One important point for our design is that when Prospect A is initially a
70% chance of receiving $10, rather than a 100% chance, CFRI violations are predicted to be
dramatically less pronounced, to the point of being imperceptible at standard CPT parame-
ter values, and always in the direction of increased risk aversion for the common future risks
described above.
Though our study is concerned with assessing the positive content of di↵erent formulations
for CPT over time, there may also be reasons to evaluate the two formulations on normative
grounds.12 Necessary and su cient axioms for the time-first evaluation of CPT are provided by
By the first indi↵erence between Prospects S and R,
 
1
u(101|r1) =  
1[⇡(0.5)u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(0.5))u(01|r1)],
and so
⇡(0.1)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   ⇡(0.1))
 
 
4
u(04|r4)
 
=
⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) + ⇡(0.05)
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ (1   (⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) + ⇡(0.05)))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
,
⇡(0.1) = ⇡(0.55)   ⇡(0.5) + ⇡(0.05).
12Indeed, CPT was, itself, formulated to address normative concerns related to violations of first order stochas-
tic dominance in original prospect theory. See Quiggin (1982) and Fishburn (1978).
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Halevy (2008) and Chew and Epstein (1989). The critical axiom, which distinguishes the risk-
first from the time-first formulation, is termed Ordinal Stochastic Dominance (OSD), requiring
First Order Stochastic Dominance to be respected for probability distributions over streams
ranked according to time preferences over deterministic outcomes. In Appendix A.2, we show
that the risk-first formulation violates OSD. We believe the documented violation conveys
less about the normative value of the risk-first formulation than about the restrictiveness of
OSD, as the examples used are intuitive and behaviorally plausible. Importantly, the time-first
formulation, itself, is not without its own normative objections. Ebert and Strack (2015, 2016)
show that time-first CPT agents may either bet when assured to eventually lose or never bet
when assured an arbitrarily high payo↵. Such extreme implications of the time-first formulation
are, of course, problematic.
3 Experimental Design
Subjects faced two series of five temporal risk tasks. In each task subjects were asked to make
a series of decisions between two options. For example, Task 1, reproduced as Figure 2, Panel
A, asked subjects to decide between $10 for sure paid in one week and a changing q-gamble
over $20 and $0 paid in one week. The row at which an individual switches from preferring
Option A to preferring Option B carries information on the indi↵erence
(1; 101, 01) ⇠ (q
⇤; 201, 01),
with q⇤ sitting in the interval of probabilities established by the switch point and the subscript 1
indicating the date of payment in one week. In each task, the probability q generally increased
by three percentage points with the objective of establishing a narrow range within which q⇤
could be identified. Tasks such as Task 1 serve to provide a benchmark for behavior. Each
subsequent task in the series composes these choices with di↵erent common future risks. For
example, Task 2, reproduced as Figure 2, Panel B, composes the choices of Task 1 with a
13
common 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks.
TASK 1
Option A or Option B
$10 in a week $20 in a week
Chance Chance
1) 100 in 100 2 or 5 in 100 2
Chance Chance
2) 100 in 100 2 or 10 in 100 2
Chance Chance
3) 100 in 100 2 or 13 in 100 2
Chance Chance
.
.
.
30) 100 in 100 2 or 95 in 100 2
Chance Chance
Panel A: Task 1
TASK 2
Option A or Option B
$10 in a week $19 in 4 weeks $20 in a week $19 in 4 weeks
Chance 1 Chance 2 Chance 1 Chance 2
1) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 5 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
2) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 10 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
3) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 13 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
.
.
.
30) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 95 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
Panel B: Task 2
Figure 2: Sample Tasks
Table 1 outlines two series of temporal risk tasks. In our primary design, Series 1, $10 paid
with certainty in one week is compared to a chance of $20 in one week. This choice is then
composed with a common 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks, 10% chance of receiving
$19 in four weeks, 90% chance of receiving $9 in four weeks, and 10% chance of receiving $9 in
four weeks. The outcomes are chosen by design such that under weak restrictions on preferences
($19 in four weeks is worth less than $20 in one week, and $9 in four weeks is worth less than $10
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in one week) an explicit ranking of outcomes and, hence, of intertemporal streams of outcomes
exists.13 In the second series of tasks, Option A carries a 70% chance of receiving $10 in one
week, (0.7; 101, 01), rather than certainty of $10. As noted below, these tasks are predicted to
deliver fewer violations of CFRI under the time-first formulation.
The thirty rows of each task provide thirty opportunities for subjects to violate CFRI
between any two tasks in a series. With five tasks per series, ten such comparisons of two tasks
can be made in each series. We calculate violations of CFRI as the di↵erence in the number
of Option A choices between task j and task k with j < k. Negative numbers correspond to
violations towards increased risk aversion, positive numbers to violations towards increased risk
tolerance.14
In addition to these two series of tasks, subjects also completed a series of prospect theory
assessment tasks following the design of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and several robustness
tasks which either presented temporal prospects in compounded form and/or removed the
temporal dimension entirely. These tasks are described in detail in Appendix A.3. Importantly,
the prospect theory assessment tasks allow us to estimate CPT parameters for our specific
sample and so to predict the extent of violations of CFRI under the time-first formulation.
One hundred and forty four undergraduate subjects from UC San Diego participated in the
study. Six sessions were conducted from 03/31/2016 to 04/28/2016. The tasks were conducted
with paper-and-pencil and organized in ‘Task Blocks’ exactly following the series of Table 1.
Separate instructions were provided at the beginning of each task block. The full set of in-
structions can be found in Appendix A.4. In order to provide incentive for truthful revelation
13An alternative design would be to elicit certainty equivalents for atemporal gambles and compose both with
common future risks. Given that the ranking of outcomes is critical to the application of CPT, we felt it prudent
to have experimental control of all outcomes. Hence, under relatively weak assumptions on preferences, a known
ordering of both outcomes and the streams exists. This design choice comes with costs and benefits. Given the
documented increased risk aversion in probability equivalent tasks such as these relative to certainty equivalent
tasks of the form generally used to elicit CPT parameters (see, e.g. Hershey, Kunreuther and Schoemaker, 1982;
Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Schoemaker, 1990; Sprenger, 2015) , a mismatch in the levels of risk aversion
may exist across experimental environments. Though this may influence the level of risk taking, it is not obvious
that this should influence the response to composition with common future risks.
14We restrict attention into individuals with unique switch points (see below) such that this measure correctly
calculates the exact number of CFRI violations.
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Table 1: Experimental Tasks and Mean Response
Series 1 Tasks Series 2 Tasks
Task # Description Mean q⇤ Task # Description Mean q⇤
(s.e.) (s.e)
1) (1; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.689 6) (.70; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.554
(0.014) (0.012)
2) (1; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.681 7) (.70; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.540
+(0.90; 194, 04) (0.015) +(0.90; 194, 04) (0.014)
3) (1; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.699 8) (.70; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.570
+(0.10; 194, 04) (0.014) +(0.10; 194, 04) (0.012)
4) (1; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.681 9) (.70; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.540
+(0.90; 94, 04) (0.014) +(0.90; 94, 04) (0.013)
5) (1; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.688 10) (.70; 101, 01) vs. (q; 201, 01) 0.562
+(0.10; 94, 04) (0.015) +(0.10; 94, 04) (0.012)
Notes: Description of experimental tasks for Series 1 and Series 2. Notation (p;X1, 01) refers to p chance of
receiving $X in one week or zero otherwise in one week. Notation +(p;X4, 04) indicates composition with common
future risk of p-chance of receiving $X in four weeks or zero otherwise in four weeks, applied to both prospects.
Mean behavior estimated based on interval regression (Stewart, 1983) of q⇤ on indicators for task with standard
errors clustered on individual level. Test of null hypothesis for equal behavior across conditions for Series 1
( 2(4) = 8.22, p = 0.084) and for Series 2 ( 2(4) = 11.37, p = 0.023).
of preferences, subjects were paid according to one, randomly chosen decision in the experi-
ment.15 On average, subjects earned $20.40.16 Comparable to other similar experiments, 30
15As our experiment has both risk and time dimensions, the process of payment is somewhat more complicated
than standard experiments in either domain separately. When beginning the experiment subjects were notified
that they would be receiving their experimental payment by mail and were asked to self-address two envelopes,
one for a sooner payment and one for a later payment. In order to eliminate any di↵erential uncertainty or
transaction costs across dates, we opted to make all experimental payments at future dates: one week and
four weeks from the study date. Further, each subject was given a $10 participation payment, split between
these two dates. Regardless of choice, subjects would always receive $5 in one week and $5 in four weeks.
These payments, which have grown common in the experimental literature (see, e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger,
2015; Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2014), are designed to help equalize transaction costs across time. In
our context, these payments also help to ensure equality in experimental receipts on the dates when risks are
imposed, controlling for potential issues related to di↵erential income e↵ects across dates.
16 The random-lottery incentive mechanism, which is widely used in experimental economics, does introduce
a compound lottery to the decision environment. The theoretical literature on choice under risk, dating to Holt
(1986) and Karni and Safra (1987), has suggested that random mechanisms need not be incentive compatible
for choices between risky prospects if either the Independence or Reduction of Compound Lotteries axioms are
violated. As CPT violates independence, the mechanism may be flawed for the elicitation of CPT behavior.
Importantly, however, Starmer and Sugden (1991); Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden (1998) demonstrate that this
mechanism can be used even when individuals deviate from expected utility as, in practice, subjects appear to
treat decisions e↵ectively in isolation. The data from our prospect theory elicitation tasks may be of critical
value here. If standard prospect theory shapes are identified there, then isolation is likely a plausible assumption
when evaluating our other tasks as well. We also attempt to encourage isolation by telling subjects to ‘treat
each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payments.’
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of 144 (20.83 percent) subjects switched multiple times in one or more experimental tasks.17
An additional 9 subjects violated dominance in one or more prospect theory elicitation tasks,
preferring either $0 with certainty to a given prospect or a prospect to its high outcome with
certainty. We exclude such subjects leaving a sample of 105 subjects.18
4 Results
Table 1 presents average values of q⇤ for each task, providing a summary of behavior for our 105
subjects. On average, there appears to be little responsiveness to changes in common future
risks in both series of behavior. For our baseline Series 1, the di↵erences in q⇤ across tasks
are on the order of 1 to 2 percentage points at most. We marginally reject the null hypothesis
that all tasks have equal values of q⇤ in series 1, ( 2 = 8.22, p = 0.084). In Series 2, though
the di↵erences in q⇤ are again small in magnitude, we reject equality with greater precision
( 2 = 11.37, p = 0.023). Below (and in Appendix A.1) we demonstrate that violations of
CFRI under the time-first model should be substantially less frequent in Series 2 than in Series
1, and should generally be in a di↵erent direction than that which is observed.19
Small e↵ects on aggregate could mask substantial violations at the individual level. As
noted above, each series yields 10 potential comparisons to test CFRI between two tasks. For
each subject, in each of these 10 comparisons, we calculate the number of invariance violations
by taking the di↵erence in the number of Option A choices between task j and task k with
j < k. Again, negative numbers correspond to violations with increased risk aversion in task
17Around 10 percent of subjects feature multiple switch points in similar price-list experiments (Holt and
Laury, 2002; Meier and Sprenger, 2010), and as many as 50 percent in some cases (Jacobson and Petrie, 2009).
As such multiple switch points may indicate subject confusion, researchers often exclude such observations or
mechanically enforce single switch points (Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom and Williams, 2005).
18The results are qualitatively unchanged by the inclusion of such subjects taking their first switch point as
the relevant choice and/or ignoring the dominance violations when calculating prospect theory parameters.
19Both data series carry some small directional e↵ects with 90% chance of $19 in the future generating more
risk tolerance (lower q⇤) and 10% chance generating more risk aversion (higher q⇤). Though the magnitudes
are far from those predicted, in Series 1, these e↵ects are in the same direction as predicted by time-first CPT.
However, in Series 2, both 90% chance and 10% chance should lead directionally to more risk aversion under
time-first CPT, contrary to the data. Given the di↵erences across conditions are actually stronger in Series 2,
we hesitate to interpret these directional e↵ects as anything more than wealth e↵ects, perhaps modulated by
disappointment or elation with regards to future earnings. See Appendix Figures A1 and A2 for further detail.
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k relative to j, positive numbers correspond to violations with increased risk tolerance, and
zero corresponds to no violation in a given comparison. Figure 3 provides histograms of these
violations. In our baseline design, Series 1, 43.2 percent of comparisons yield zero violations
of CFRI and 62 percent yield 1 or fewer. The violations are symmetric, with 28.5 percent
of comparisons yielding violations towards increased risk aversion and 28.3 percent towards
increased risk tolerance. Similar patterns are observed in Series 2: 53.1 percent of comparisons
have zero CFRI violations and 69.4 percent have 1 or fewer.20
Also graphed in Figure 3 are CPT predictions for the frequency of violations under risk-first
and time-first formulations. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Tversky and Fox
(1995), we obtain CPT parameters from our prospect theory assessment tasks via a non-linear
least squares estimation routine.21 Our subjects reliably reproduce the standard finding of
inverse S -shaped probability weighting from assessment exercises of this form at parameter
values close to other empirical estimates. With aggregate estimates of probability weighting in
hand, we construct a prediction on the frequency of CFRI violations that should be observed
in each comparison.22
20The violations appear symmetric, with 24.8 percent of comparisons yielding violations towards increased
risk aversion and 22.1 percent towards increased risk tolerance.
21For these certainty equivalents data, we assume a reference point of r = 0 and specific functional forms for
utility and probability weighting such that the indi↵erence condition
 
1
u(c|0) =  1 (⇡(p) · u(25|0) + (1   ⇡(p))u(0|0))
is met for each observation. We follow the parameterization of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with power
utility above the reference point, u(x|0) = (x   0)↵, and the weighting function ⇡(p) = p /(p  + (1   p) )1/  .
The parameters  ̂ and ↵̂ are then estimated as the values that minimize the sum of squared residuals of the
non-linear regression equation
c = [p /(p  + (1   p) )1/  ⇥ 25↵]
1
↵ + ✏.
where c is the midpoint of the interval of the certainty equivalent defined by experimental choice. Con-
ducting such analysis on our aggregate data with standard errors clustered on the subject level, we obtain
↵̂ = 1.033 (s.e. = 0.031) and  ̂ = 0.696 (0.017). The benchmark model of expected utility   = 1, is rejected
at all conventional levels, (F1,104 = 321.32, p < 0.01). This compares favorably with other estimates such as
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) who estimate  ̂ = 0.61 and  ̂ = 0.71, respectively.
Although changes in the parametric specification of the utility function would modify the magnitude of our
predicted changes, under most specifications their directions would remain unchanged.
22To develop these predictions we apply the probability weighting function previously estimated and allow
curvature, ↵ to be determined by the atemporal choices from Task 1 for Series 1 comparisons and Task 6
for Series 2 comparisons. This allows behavior in Tasks 1 and 6 to serve as the relevant benchmark. These
predictions could use the prospect theory assessment tasks’ estimate of ↵. The implemented procedure allows
us to sidestep known di↵erences in risk aversion across probability equivalent and certainty equivalent designs
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Notes: Histograms of Common Future Risk Invariance violations for Series 1 (Panel A) and Series 2 (Panel B).
10 comparisons per series ⇥ 105 subjects = 1050 observations in each panel. Actual data as grey bars. Time-
First Prediction as white bars. Risk-First Prediction of zero violations as red lin. All comparisons calculated
as di↵erence in number of Option A choices between j and task k with j < k. Negative numbers correspond
to increased risk aversion, positive numbers to increased risk tolerance. Actual violations top/bottom coded at
+/-5 for illustration only.
Figure 3: Predicted and Actual CFRI Violations
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At the aggregate parameter estimates, violations should be observed in 70 percent of cases
in Series 1 for the time-first formulation of CPT. Forty percent of comparisons should yield
violations towards increased risk aversion while thirty percent of comparisons should yield
violations towards increased risk tolerance. Of course, the risk-first formulation predicts zero
violations of CFRI. Non-parametric tests reject equality of the predicted time-first and actual
distribution for the frequency of violations (z = 2.552, p = 0.01, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test). The raw correlation between time-first predicted and actual violations is ⇢ = 0.09 for
Series 1. Violations are predicted to be non-existent in Series 2 under the time-first model.
Nonetheless actual violations of CFRI remain and the distributions of actual violations are
indistinguishable across Series 1 and Series 2 (z = 0.757, p = 0.45, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test). As such, violations of CFRI are symmetric and exist in around 50 percent of cases,
whether they are predicted by the time-first model or not.
One first way to assess the relative predictive content of the time-first and risk-first for-
mulations is to compare Mean Squared Error (MSE).23 In Series 1, the MSE of the time-first
formulation is 11.08, while the MSE of the risk-first formulation is 8.16, indicating around a
35% improvement in predictive accuracy when adopting the risk-first formulation. Given that
both formulations predict zero violations in Series 2, they share a common MSE value of 9.53.
Prospect theory parameters are estimable at the individual level as well.24 As such, time-first
predictions can be generated for each subject individually. Interestingly, in Series 1 violations of
CFRI are predicted to be rather less frequent using individualized measures, only 54.4 percent of
cases. Despite these less frequent violations, we again reject equality of distributions between
individualized time-first predicted and actual distributions (z = 2.305, p = 0.02, Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test). Furthermore, individualized measures do little to improve the correlation
between time-first predicted and actual values, ⇢ = 0.09, or the relatively poor fit compared to
(see, e.g. Hershey et al., 1982; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Schoemaker, 1990; Sprenger, 2015).
23Given that the risk-first formulation always predicts zero violation, correlation cannot provide a basis for
comparison.
24Using prospect theory assessment tasks, we estimate probability weighting,  i, for each subject (assuming
↵i equal to 1 for each individual). The distribution of  i is provided in Appendix Figure A7. The median value
of  i is 0.72, echoing the aggregate parameter estimates, and the 5th to 95th percentiles range from 0.41 to 1.02.
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the risk-first formulation. The MSE of the time-first formulation reduces only to 10.64 under
the individual predictions, again yielding inferior accuracy to the risk-first formulation. Given
the heterogeneity in prospect theory parameters, the individual time-first predictions for Series
2 also exhibit some heterogeneity. Violations of CFRI are now predicted in 15.6% of cases
under the time-first model. Though the distribution of time-first predictions is not statistically
distinguishable from the distribution of actual violations (z = 0.86, p = 0.39, Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test), the correlation between predicted and actual violations is again limited, ⇢ = 0.07,
and the time-first and risk-first models again have e↵ectively identical values of MSE (time-first
9.52, risk-first 9.53).
Though the content of the time-first model’s exact predictions are limited, there may be
some merit to the model’s directional predictions for violations that lead to broadly more or
broadly less risk taking. In Table 2, we explore this possibility in more detail. We construct an
indicator variable, Success (=1), which takes the value 1 if a given violation (or lack thereof)
is directionally predicted by the time-first formulation and zero otherwise. We regress the
measure of predictive success on indicators for whether the time first model predicts a risk
averse violation, a risk seeking violation, or no violation at all. Using the aggregate time-first
predictions for Series 1, in column (1) we show that the success rate is around 44% when no
violation is predicted, and drops to around 35% when the time-first model predicts violations
of increased risk aversion or increased risk tolerance. Table 2 also provides comparison of
predictive success of the time-first model to random chance. Notably, when the aggregate
time-first model predicts a risk averse violation in Series 1 (40% of cases), it actually occurs
at a rate that cannot be distinguished from chance (F1,104 = 0.87, p = 0.35).25 When it
predicts a risk seeking violation (30% of cases) it occurs at a rate marginally significantly
higher than chance. Overall, the predictive accuracy of the time-first model in Series 1 of
0.352 is around 4 percentage points better than chance, bolstered particularly by the 30%
25In column (1), the time first formulation predicts 40% risk averse, 30% risk seeking, and 30% no directional
violations. Actual directional violations are 28.48%, 28.28%, and 43.24%, respectively. Overall chance success
therefor is = 100 ⇤ (0.4 ⇤ 0.2848 + 0.3 ⇤ 0.2828 + 0.3 ⇤ 0.4324) = 32.85%. Other columns and values are similarly
calculated.
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Table 2: Predictive Success of Time-First and Risk-First Formulations
Dependent Variable: Success (=1)
Aggregate Predictions Individual Predictions
Series 1 Series 2 Series 1 Series 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TF Predicts:
Risk Averse Violation -0.125 - -0.132 -0.159
(0.061) - (0.066) (0.077)
Risk Tolerant Violation -0.089 - -0.087 -0.279
(0.062) - (0.066) (0.112)
No Violation (Constant) 0.441 0.531 0.470 0.544
(0.039) (0.034) (0.047) (0.036)
# Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050
# Clusters 105 105 105 105
Comparison: Time First to Chance Success:
TF - Chance (TF Predicts R.A. Violation) 0.317-0.285 - 0.337-0.285 0.385-0.248
F1,104 = 0.87 - F1,104 = 1.73 F1,104 = 4.84
(p = 0.35) - (p = 0.19) (p = 0.03)
TF - Chance (TF Predicts R.T. Violation) 0.352-0.283 - 0.383-0.283 0.265-0.221
F1,104 = 3.83 - F1,104 = 6.11 F1,104 = 0.17
(p = 0.05) (p = 0.02) (p = 0.68)
TF - Chance (Overall) 0.365-0.328 - 0.409-0.352 0.515-0.486
F1,104 = 4.20 - F1,104 = 5.21 F1,104 = 0.88
(p = 0.04) - (p = 0.02) (p = 0.35)
Comparison: Time First to Risk First Success:
TF - RF (Overall) 0.365-0.432 - 0.409-0.432 0.515-0.531
F1,104 = 14.57 - F1,104 = 0.91 F1,104 = 0.27
(p < 0.01) - (p = 0.34) (p = 0.60)
TF - RF (TF Predicts Violation) 0.332-0.429 - 0.357-0.401 0.360-0.463
F1,104 = 11.15 - F1,104 = 1.85 F1,104 = 3.08
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.18) (p = 0.08)
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression of Success (=1), successful time-first prediction of CFRI directional violation,
in given comparison on constant and predicted directional violation from time-first formulation. Standard errors,
clustered, on the individual level in parentheses. Test statistics constructed from linear combinations of regression
coe cients tested against chance or risk first predictive success. Column (1): time first formulation predicts 40% risk
averse, 30% risk seeking, and 30% no directional violations. Actual directional violations are 28.48%, 28.28%, and
43.24%, respectively. Chance success = 100 ⇤ (0.4 ⇤ 0.285+0.3 ⇤ 0.283+0.3 ⇤ 0.432) = 32.8%. Other columns and values
similarly calculated.
22
of cases in which no violation is predicted. Quite similar results are observed when using
individual predictions in columns (3) and (4), though the predictive accuracy for Series 1 is
improved slightly under the individualized measures (largely driven by the increased prediction
of non-violations). Interestingly, the individualized measures for Series 2 actually lead to worse
predictive accuracy overall (0.531 vs. 0.515), relative to the aggregate Series 2 prediction of
zero violations.
Table 2 also provides comparisons between the predictive accuracies of the time-first and
risk-first models based on their directional success rates. Overall in Series 1, the risk-first model
accuracy exceeds the time-first model by a statistically significant 7 percentage points (around
19 percent), and does so particularly when the time-first model predicts a violation (around 35
percent). Similar conclusions are also drawn when using individualized predictions. When the
time-first model deviates from the risk-first prediction of zero CFRI violations, the risk-first
model out-predicts it by 4-10 percentage points (11 to 31 percent).
Taken together our results indicate that the risk-first model provides a more coherent ac-
count of the data than the time-first model, with noise perhaps generating the CFRI violations
that are observed. One plausible explanation for the relative success of the risk-first formula-
tion is that subjects may be eliminating or ignoring common elements across decisions. In two
robustness tasks, we repeat the decisions made in Tasks 2 and 3 with all probabilities com-
pounded, removing any common decision elements (see Figure A4, Panel A for an example).
Compared to the uncompounded tasks we find both very similar levels of response along with a
substantial correlation at the individual level.26 Though violations of CFRI in these situations
are more frequent in the compound frame (89 percent vs. 60 percent), they are again sym-
metric, and are negatively correlated with the aggregate and individual time-first predictions
(⇢ =  0.165 and ⇢ =  0.002, respectively). The risk-first model again provides enhanced
predictive power in terms of MSE for these conditions (32.02 vs. 42.58 and 37.59, for the
26Task 2’s mean q⇤ are 0.68 and 0.73 for the uncompounded and compounded tasks, respectively. Task 3’s
are 0.70 and 0.71. Correlation in number of Option A choices for Task 2 is 0.50 and Task 3 is 0.43 between the
compounded and uncompounded tasks.
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aggregate and individual predictions, respectively). Appendix Figure A5 provides a histogram
of violations for these conditions along with the time first predictions and the corresponding
violations in the uncompounded task.27
In one further set of robustness tasks, we removed the intertemporal nature of risks. Tasks
were identical to Tasks 2-5 and 7-10, except common risks occurred in the same period. In
principle, both CPT formulations should predict sensitivity to such common contemporaneous
risks. Appendix Figure A6 provides histograms of behavior in these conditions, showing similar
behavior when risks are contemporaneous.
5 Conclusion
Recognizing that many economic decisions involve both risk and time, we attempt to understand
whether the temporal dimension or the risk dimension is evaluated first. Though under the
benchmark model of discounted expected utility (DEU) the ordering is of no consequence,
under a leading behavioral alternative, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), di↵erent orders
can lead to qualitative di↵erences in choice behavior. If temporal risks are viewed as a stream
of prospects, what we call ‘risk-first’ evaluation, behavior should be uninfluenced by common
future risks. In contrast, if such risks are viewed as a prospect of streams, what we call ‘time-
first’ evaluation, future risks can have a dramatic influence on behavior, leading to violations
of Common Future Risk Invariance (CFRI).
Our experimental examination demonstrates that though the hallmarks of CPT are observed
in atemporal choice, violations of invariance predicted by ‘time-first’ evaluation are generally not
observed in the data. Violations do occur, but have little predictable sensitivity to common
future risks. We interpret these findings as being supportive of noisy ‘risk-first’ evaluation.
This interpretation is bolstered by a set of additional tasks and robustness tests demonstrating
further lack of predictive accuracy for the time-first model, and that simple heuristics related
27Interestingly, the distribution of violations across the compounded and uncompounded versions of the tasks
are not statistically distinguishable (z =  1.319, p = 0.19, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).
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to the elimination of common attributes are not driving the e↵ects.
These findings have immediate implications for evaluating applications of CPT in temporal
settings. Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) make use of the time-first formulation to rational-
ize the findings of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) using CPT. Though such ex-post exercises
demonstrate the flexibility of the CPT model, the current results indicate that the behavior
documented by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) is unlikely to be driven by such considerations.
The results may also prove useful for disciplining the application of non-expected utility
models through time and for identifying risk preferences in general. If evaluation is ‘time-first’,
future exogenous risks can lead to increased risk aversion or increased risk seeking depending
on payment probabilities and values. The flexibility of the time-first formulation permits CPT
to rationalize many patterns of behavior. Our findings lead naturally to a narrower set of
predictions. If future exogenous risks influenced current behavior following time-first logic, the
practice of measuring risk preferences would also grow substantially more complex. Researchers
would be required to measure not only relevant future risks, but also the heterogeneity thereof,
to make statements about the distribution of risk preferences. Furthermore, any apparent
instability in measured risk preferences could plausibly be interpreted as changes to future
risks. Our findings help to sidestep these natural challenges of the time-first formulation,
and help to support existing applications for prospect theory in the field assuming separation
through time.
Several extensions exist for our exercise. Most importantly is the design choice of indepen-
dent future risks, uninfluenced by choice. Many natural settings involve current risky decisions
that alter the distribution of future risks. Assessing di↵erential formulations of non-DEU mod-
els in these settings could yield additional insights.
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A Appendix
A.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory, Violations of Common Future
Risk Invariance and Simulated Behavior
Risk-First Evaluation: Consider a CPT decision-maker who faces temporal risks and first
evaluates each period’s distribution of outcomes separately. Then, in each period, t, there exists
a prospect consisting of a set of outcomes, xt = {x1,t, x2,t, ..., xN,t}, received with corresponding
probabilities pt = {p1,t, p2,t, ..., pN,t};
PN
i=1 pi,t = 1. When faced with a finite stream of such
prospects from t = 0 to t = T , the decisionmaker’s utility is
TX
t=0
 
N,tX
i,t=1,t
 
⇡(
X
j,ti,t
pj,t)   ⇡(
X
j,t<i,t
pj,t)
!
 
t
u(xi,t|rt)
!
,
where rt is reference point in each period.
Importantly, such a decision-maker’s atemporal risk taking is unperturbed by composition
with common future risks.28 To illustrate in our context, take an atemporal choice such as that
analyzed in Task 1, between $10 for sure and a q% chance of receiving $20, both to be paid in
1 week’s time. Under risk-first evaluation, the indi↵erence condition for q⇤ is
 
1
u(101|r1) =  
1(⇡(q⇤1)u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(q
⇤
1))u(01|r1)).
Compose these risks with a common 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks to arrive at the
choices analyzed in Task 2, and the indi↵erence condition for q⇤⇤ is
 
1
u(101|r1) + 4 (⇡(0.94)u(194|r4) + (1   ⇡(0.94))u(04|r4)) =
 
1 (⇡(q⇤⇤1 )u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(q
⇤⇤
1 ))u(01|r1)) + 
4 (⇡(0.94)u(194|r4) + (1   ⇡(0.94))u(04|r4)) .
28Under the risk first evaluation preferences inherit a weak for of intertemporal separability. Essentially, all
future common risks do not a↵ect the marginal trade-o↵ rate between the atemporal lotteries.
1
Noting the elimination of the common 90% of 19 regardless of the shape of utility or probability
weighting,
q
⇤ = q⇤⇤.
The composition with common future risks will have no e↵ect on choices in our environment
because they a↵ect both prospect’s valuations equally.
Time First Evaluation: Consider a CPT decision-maker who faces the intertemporal risks
as above, but first evaluates each stream of outcomes and then evaluates the probability dis-
tribution over streams. In this case there exists only one prospect (p,x). The elements of
x = {x1,x2, ...,xN} are now distinct streams of outcomes, {x0, x1, ..., xT}, which are ordered
by their time preference ranking. For example, x1 = argmax
x
PT
t=0  
t
u(xt|rt). The elements of
p = {p1, p2, ..., pN};
PN
i=1 pi = 1 are the probabilities with which these streams arise. Such a
time-first evaluation yields a prospect of streams with utility
NX
i=1
  
⇡(
X
ji
pj)   ⇡(
X
j<i
pj)
! 
i,TX
i,t=0
 
t
u(xi,t|rt)
!!
,
or
NX
i=1
 
⇡(
X
ji
pj)   ⇡(
X
j<i
pj)
!
u(xi|r),
where u(xi|r) =
Pi,T
i,t=0  
t
u(xi,t|rt).
In contrast to risk-first evaluation, such a time-first decision-maker’s atemporal choice be-
havior should be altered by composition with common future risks.29 The basic intuition is
straightforward. Composition with future risks alters the cumulative distribution of potential
streams and so should shift the extent of risk taking. Furthermore, among future risks di↵erent
payment values and probabilities can have quite di↵erent e↵ects. Two future payment values
that induce di↵erent rankings of streams could lead to quite di↵erent levels of risk taking,
while two future payment probabilities that induce di↵erent cumulative distributions of ranked
29See appendix 2.
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streams could do the same.
Take an atemporal choice such as that analyzed in Task 1, between $10 for sure and a q%
chance of receiving $20, both to be paid in 1 week’s time. Under the time first evaluation, the
indi↵erence conditionfor q⇤ is
 
1
u(101|r1) = ⇡(q
⇤
1) 
1
u(201|r1) + (1   ⇡(q
⇤
1)) 
1
u(01|r1).
Composing these risks with a common 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks to arrive
at the choices analyzed in Task 2 now requires the researcher to establish the ranking of streams
induced by time preference. Assume  , u(xt|rt), and a stream of reference points, r1, r4, such
that when considering the q% chance of receiving $20 in one week composed with a 90% chance
of $19 in four weeks, the ranking of streams is x1 = {201, 194}, x2 = {201, 04}, x3 = {01, 194},
x4 = {01, 04}.30 These streams arise with probabilities p = {0.9q, 0.1q, 0.9(1  q), 0.1(1  q)}.
The corresponding utility is
⇡(0.9q) ( 1u(201|r1) +  4u(194|r4)) + (⇡(q)   ⇡(0.9q))
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
+
(⇡(0.9 + 0.1q)   ⇡(q)) ( 1u(01|r1) +  4u(194|r4)) + (1   ⇡(0.9 + 0.1q))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  
4
u(04|r4)
 
.
Similarly, when considering $10 with certainty in one week composed with a 90% chance of $19
in four weeks, assume the ranking x1 = {101, 194}, x2 = {101, 04}, which arise with probabilities
p = {0.9, 0.1}. The corresponding utility is
⇡(0.9) ( 1u(101|r1) +  4u(194|r4)) +
(1   ⇡(0.9)) ( 1u(101|r1) +  4u(04|r4)) .
30Assuming the subjects are not facing additional income risks in weeks 2 and 3. For computing our empirical
results we assume   = 1, u(x|r) = x↵ and r = 0.
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The indi↵erence condition for q⇤⇤ establishes
 
1
u(101|r1) = ⇡(q
⇤⇤) 1u(201|r1) + (⇡(0.9q
⇤⇤) + ⇡(0.9 + 0.1q⇤⇤)   ⇡(q⇤⇤)   ⇡(0.9))
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
+ Z,
where Z is a collection of utility terms where the decision-maker receives zero in a given period.31
Letting u(0|rt) = 0, and recalling the indi↵erence condition from above, this implies,
(⇡(q⇤1)   ⇡(q
⇤⇤))  1u(201|r1) = ([⇡(0.9 + 0.1q
⇤⇤)   ⇡(0.9)]   [⇡(q⇤⇤)   ⇡(0.9q⇤⇤)])
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
.
Hence, q⇤ and q⇤⇤ will only generally be equal if ⇡(·) is linear. Furthermore, the di↵erence
between q⇤ and q⇤⇤ will depend on whether adding 0.1q⇤⇤ has a larger impact on probability
distortion when probabilities are in the neighborhood of 0.9 or are in the neighborhood of
q
⇤⇤. This depends on both the shape of probability weighting and on the curvature of the
utility function. Parametric formulations for S -shaped probability weighting generally feature
a convex region from around probability 0.3 to 1 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). If q⇤⇤ sits
in this region but lies below 0.9, the addition of 0.1q⇤⇤ will have a larger influence around
probability 0.9, and hence the di↵erence between q⇤ and q⇤⇤ will be positive. Stated di↵erently,
the decision-maker will likely grow more risk tolerant when the atemporal risks of Task 1 are
composed with common future risks of a 90% chance of $19 in four weeks in Task 2.
Importantly, given that probability distortions are often posited to have both concave and
convex regions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the prediction that individuals will grow more
risk tolerant with common future risks is not universal. Consider, instead of a 90% chance of
$19 in 4 weeks, a 10% chance of $19 in 4 weeks as in Task 3. The ranking of outcomes does not
change, but now when considering a q% chance of receiving $20 in one week composed with a
10% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks, p = {0.1q, 0.9q, 0.1(1   q), 0.9(1   q)}.32 Let q⇤⇤⇤
reflect indi↵erence in Task 3. Following the same logic as above one arrives at the following
31
Z =
 
⇡(.9) + 1   ⇡(.9q⇤⇤)   ⇡(q + .9(1   q))
 
 
1
u(0|r) +
 
1   ⇡(p2)
 
 
4
u(0|r).
32That is, the ranking of streams is x1 = {201, 194}, x2 = {201, 04}, x3 = {01, 194}, x4 = {01, 04}. The
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di↵erence between risk taking in Tasks 1 and 3:
(⇡(q⇤1)   ⇡(q
⇤⇤⇤))  1u(201|r1) = ([⇡(0.1 + 0.9q
⇤⇤⇤)   ⇡(0.1)]   [⇡(q⇤⇤⇤)   ⇡(0.1q⇤⇤⇤)])
 
 
4
u(194|r4)
 
.
The question now is whether the addition of 0.9q⇤⇤⇤ has a larger e↵ect at probability 0.1 or
at probability 0.1q⇤⇤⇤. Given that 0.1 and 0.1q⇤⇤⇤ are likely to be in the region of concavity
then, provided ⇡(·) does not become too sharply convex, the di↵erence is likely to be negative.
Stated di↵erently, the decisionmaker will likely grow more risk averse when the atemporal risks
of Task 1 are composed with common future risks of a 10% chance of $19 in four weeks in Task
3.
Developing further intuition about the direction and magnitude of these e↵ects is challenging
as predictions are dependent upon not only the exact shape of probability weighting, but also on
the combined e↵ects of the utility function and probability distortions. In order to gain further
insights on the e↵ects of common future risks, we conduct simulations using the functional forms
for probability weighting and utility proposed in the original formulation of CPT (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992)33, which posited probability weighting function, ⇡(p) = p /(p +(1 p) )1/ , a
reference point of r = 0, and utility function u(x) = x↵ for x > r = 0. The parameters identified
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) were   = 0.61 and ↵ = 0.88. Under these parameters we
simulate behavior in Series 1 and Series 2 of our study. The corresponding predictions for
behavior are provided in Figure A1, Panels A and B. In each panel we present the atemporal
choice as the dashed black line. Given that the risk first evaluation predicts no sensitivity
to common future risks, the dashed black line also corresponds to the risk-first prediction.
corresponding utility is
⇡(0.1q)
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  4u(194|r4)
 
+
(⇡(q)   ⇡(0.1q))
 
 
1
u(201|r1) +  4u(04|r4)
 
+
(⇡(0.1 + 0.9q)   ⇡(q))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  4u(194|r4)
 
+
(1   ⇡(0.1 + 0.9q))
 
 
1
u(01|r1) +  4u(04|r4)
 
.
33Tversky and Fox (1995) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) employ a similar two parameter ⇡(p) function. See
Prelec (1998) for alternative S -shaped specifications.
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Panel A echoes the intuition presented above. When common future risks occur with high
probability decisionmakers grow more risk tolerant, while when they occur with low probability
decisionmakers grow more risk averse. The magnitudes can be dramatic. A CPT decisionmaker
with   = 0.61 and ↵ = 0.88 should be indi↵erent between $10 for sure in a week and a 71.4%
chance of $20 in a week. When composed with a 90% chance of receiving $19 in four weeks,
this probability falls to 60.2%. When composed with a 10% chance of receiving $19 in four
weeks, this probability rises to to 72.5%. The existence of future risks can alter risk taking by
as much as sixteen percent, and whether future risks are high or low probability can alter risk
taking by as much as twenty percent, (72.5-60.2/ 60.2 = 0.204)
Interestingly, the distinction between high and low probability seems to matter qualitatively
more than the distinction between high and low payment values. Given a probability of future
payment, both high and low values lead directionally to similar changes in risk taking.
It should be noted that the links between future payment probabilities and risk taking are
not universal. In addition to depending on the shape of probability weighting and utility, the
predictions also depend on the initial atemporal prospects . As demonstrated in Figure A1,
Panel B corresponding to Series 2 of the study, if instead of certainty of $10, decisionmakers
chooses between a 70% chance of $10 and a q% chance of $20 in one week, common future
risks increase risk tolerance regardless of their probability. In Series 2, the e↵ect of common
of future risks is smaller in magnitude. Most comparisons between two tasks yield deviations
smaller than our experimental granularity of three percentage points. Of additional note is that
the relationship between risk taking and future payment values can be non-monotonic. The
combined e↵ects of utility function curvature and probability weighting can lead to situations
where higher payment values move probability equivalents into regions of greater convexity,
generating the potential for such e↵ects.
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Figure A1: Theoretical Predictions
Whether temporal risks are evaluated in a risk-first or a time-first mode can lead to both
qualitative and quantitative di↵erences in predicted behavior. Our experimental design is
predicated on investigating the extent to which behavior adheres to each of these models at
both the aggregate and individual level. In Figure A2 we provide the time-first predictions and
behavior for our sample at the aggregate estimate probability weighting parameter of   = 0.697.
To develop predictions we estimate ↵ separately for Task 1 and Task 6 following
⇡(q) =
10↵
20↵
+ ✏,
for Task 1 or
⇡(q) = ⇡(0.7)
10↵
20↵
+ ✏,
for Task 6. The values ⇡(q) and ⇡(0.7) are the distorted probability values at   = 0.697 for
each subject. The objective of this exercise, to let Tasks 1 and 6 serve as benchmarks for
their relevant series, seems to be met. At the estimated parameter values, Task 1 and Task 6
predictions are within 0.015 of the true values.
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Figure A2: Predictions and Behavior
Our time-first behavioral predictions at the aggregate parameter estimate of   = 0.697 are
quite similar to those noted above. In Series 1, sharp di↵erences in behavior are predicted with
changes to common future risk, while in Series 2 the sensitivity of behavior is more muted.
Indeed, in Series 2, none of the predicted di↵erences are large enough to be identified by our
design’s granularity of three percentage points. Figure A2 also provides the mean behavior
presented in Table 1 for each series. Behavior in Series 1 appears largely unresponsive to future
risks. As noted in the text, no statistical di↵erences across tasks in Series 1 are observed.
However, the the directional predictions do seem consistent, with more risk aversion under the
10% future risks than 90% future risks. Di↵erences across tasks in Series 2, though predicted
to be muted, are actually statistically distinguishable. Importantly, the direction of actual
di↵erences is inconsistent with the direction of time-first predictions. Instead of growing more
risk averse with common future risks, subjects grow somewhat less so for the case of 90% future
risks.
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A.2 Ordinal Stochastic Dominance and Normative Implications
This paper is mainly concerned with positive tests of di↵erent versions of models of temporal
CPT. However, it is worth stressing that CPT was originally developed to address normative
concerns. In its original formulation PT lead to violations of first order stochastic dominance34.
Following this tradition, we would like to stress, that from a normative perspective, time-first
can have more desirable normative properties. Since some nuance is involved, the following
axiom and proofs clarify the sense in which time-first is more normatively appealing than
risk-first.
The neccesary and su cient axioms neccesary for a representation of time-first are provided
by Halevy (2008) and Chew and Epstein (1989). The critical axiom, for the purpose of this
section, is ordinal (stochastic) dominance axiom. This axiom, formally stated bellow, ensures
that first order stochastic dominance is extended and preserved for a given preference ranking
over all deterministic time-dated outcomes. As the following example will prove, risk-first
violates this axiom.
Ordinal (Stochastic) Dominance Axiom (OSD): Let C+ be the space of bounded non-
negative consumption vectors. For all p0, p, probability distributions over consumption vectors,
if p0{c 2 C+ : c ⌫ c̄}   p{c 2 C+ : c ⌫ c̄} for all c̄ 2 C+ then p0 ⌫ p.
Proof (that risk-first violates Ordinal Dominance) Let L = {(1; x1, 01), (1; 02), (1; 03), ...} and
L
0 = {(1/n; x1,1, 01), ..., (1/n; xn,n, 0n)} such that u(xt,t) =   tu(x  ✏) and all positive prizes in
L
0 are perfectly correlated. That is, L delivers x units of the consumption good today for sure
and L0 will deliver x  ✏ worth, in terms of today’s present discounted value, of the consumtion
good during some time period, either today or in the future before some time n. Clearly, L
OSD L0, but for a risk-first agent U(L) = u(x) <
P
t ⇡(
1
n)u(x  ✏) = U(L
0) for some n as long
as ⇡ is concave for low enough values
We do not view this example as particularly strained: why isn’t it reasonable to
pay an ✏ for the surprise of timing? Similar examples going the other direction do not
34See Quiggin (1982) and Fishburn (1978).
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seem obviously strained either. Consider L = {(1; x1, 01), (1; 02), (1; 03), ...} and L0 =
{(1/2; x1, 01), (1/2; x2, 02) + (1; 03), ...}, again with perfect correlation for the outcomes of L0
and u(x1 + ✏) =  u(x2). L0 OSD L, but for the risk-first agent if ⇡(0.5) is su ciently below 0.5,
U(L0) = ⇡(0.5)u(x1) + ⇡(0.5)u(x1 + ✏) < u(x1) = u(L). Again, it does not seem absurd to pay
an ✏ to be assured the payment will occur in the first period.35
A.3 Additional Tasks and Behavior
A.3.1 Prospect Theory Assessment Tasks
TASK 26
Option A or Option B
50 in 100 Chance 100 in 100 Chance
1) $25 in a week 2 or $25.00 in a week 2
2) $25 in a week 2 or $24.00 in a week 2
3) $25 in a week 2 or $23.00 in a week 2
.
.
.
26) $25 in a week 2 or $0.00 in a week 2
Figure A3: CPT Task
In order to provide a prediction for how much the composition of future risks should alter be-
havior depending on mode of evaluation, we also conduct additional tasks, standard in the CPT
literature (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), for evaluating the extent of probability weighting.
Each subject faced 7 tasks eliciting their certainty equivalent to be paid in one week for a p%
chance of receiving $25 in one week. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the seven tasks
corresponded to p 2 {0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95}. An example task is provided as
Figure A3 and the seven prospect theory assessment tasks are enumerated in Table 1, Panel
35Uncorrelated examples can also be constructed, but are dependent on the shape of the probability weighting
function.
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C.36
A.3.2 Compounded Tasks and Common Contemporaneous Risk
In addition to the above tasks assessing prospect theory and the mode of evaluation for temporal
risks, our design includes two types of robustness tests. First, our tasks are designed in price
list format where common future risks are presented as an additional column. Readers may
be concerned that heuristics such as the elimination of common attributes might lead common
future risks to be ignored. In our first set of of robustness tasks, we re-conduct Tasks 2, 3, 11
and 12 with all risks compounded. In such tasks, one cannot eliminate common future risks by
simply ignoring a column of the task.37 Appendix Figure A4, Panel A provides an example.
Second, our tasks compose atemporal risky choices with common future risks. A natural
question is whether common risks applied in the same period deliver qualitatively di↵erent
results. Under CPT, regardless of the order of evaluation, the composition with common risks
within a period should alter behavior. Our second set of robustness tasks re-conduct tasks 2-5
and 7-10 with the common risks imposed within the same period in one week (as opposed to
in four weeks). Appendix Figure A4, Panel B provides an example.38
36We opted to elicit the extent of atemporal non-expected utility behavior at only one point in time, in one
week, rather than both in one week and in four weeks. Naturally, if there exist non-stationarities in probability
distortions one could imagine that future risks would be treated di↵erently than sooner risks. In the time first
evaluation this is di cult to think through ... what function do you use for the cumulatives. Importantly,
however, we can examine the relationship between our findings of probability distortions at one week and those
at other time scales to assess the plausibility of such lack of stationarity.
37It should be noted that subjects were more likely to provide multiple switch points for this task, which
could be interpreted as a measure of confusion.
38For completeness we also did the common atemporal risks with all the compounding, but we don’t talk
about that.
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TASK 21
Option A or Option B
$10 in a week $10 in a week $20 in a week $20 in a week $0 in a week $0 in a week
and and and and and and
$19 in 4 weeks $0 in 4 weeks $19 in 4 weeks $0 in 4 weeks $19 in 4 weeks $0 in 4 weeks
1) 90 in 100 10 in 100 2 or 4.5 in 100 .5 in 100 85.5 in 100 9.5 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance
2) 90 in 100 10 in 100 2 or 9 in 100 1 in 100 81 in 100 9 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance
3) 90 in 100 10 in 100 2 or 11.7 in 100 1.3 in 100 78.3 in 100 8.7 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance
.
.
.
30) 90 in 100 10 in 100 2 or 85.5 in 100 9.5 in 100 4.5 in 100 .5 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance Chance
(a) Task 21
TASK 11
Option A or Option B
$10 in a week $19 in a week $20 in a week $19 in a week
Chance 1 Chance 2 Chance 1 Chance 2
1) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 5 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
2) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 10 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
3) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 13 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
.
.
.
30) 100 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 95 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
(b) Task 11
Figure A4: Sample Robustness Tasks
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A.3.3 Results
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Figure A5: Predicted and Actual CFRI Violations (Compounded)
Notes: Histogram of Common Future Risk Invariance violations for Task 1, Task 2 (compounded), and Task
3 (compounded). Three comparisons ⇥ 105 subjects = 315 observations in each panel. Actual data as grey
bars. Time-First Prediction as white bars. All comparisons calculated di↵erence in number of Option A choices
between task j and task k with aggregate prediction for j < k. Negative numbers correspond to increased risk
aversion, positive numbers to increased risk tolerance.
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Figure A6: CRI Violations Without Time
Notes: Histograms of Atemporal Common Risk Invariance violations for Series 1 (Panel A) and Series 2 (Panel
B). 10 comparisons per series ⇥ 105 subjects = 1050 observations in each panel. Actual data as grey bars. Time-
First Prediction/Risk-First predictions as white bars. Temporal Common Future Risk Invariance violations as
black lines for comparison. All comparisons calculated di↵erence in number of Option B choices between task
j and task k with aggregate prediction for j < k. Negative numbers correspond to increased risk aversion,
positive numbers to increased risk tolerance.
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Figure A7: Individual Probability Weighting Estimates
Notes: Distribution of probability weighting parameters by subject. Parameters estimated from non-linear
regression from the seven prospect theory evaluation tasks for every subject.
A.4 Experimental Instructions
Experimental Instructions
Please read carefully
Hello and Welcome.
ELIGIBILITY FOR THIS STUDY:
To be eligible for this study, you must have a mailing address. This address
must be a valid way for you to receive mail from now through the end of Spring
Quarter.
You must also be willing to receive your payment for this study by check.
Checks will be written by Professor Charles Sprenger, Associate Professor
of Economics. The checks will be drawn on the CHASE bank on campus.
You may deposit or cash your checks wherever you like. If you wish, you
can cash your checks for free at CHASE any weekday from 9:00 am to 6:00
pm or Saturdays from 10:00 am to 2:00pm at the Price Center with valid
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identification (drivers license, passport, etc.).
Checks will be delivered to you via the mail. The value and timing of
payments you will receive will be determined by your decisions in this study,
and by chance. The soonest you could be mailed a payment is in a week. The
latest you could be mailed a payment is four weeks from today. If you do not
meet all of these criteria, please inform us of this now.
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Earning Money:
You will receive a $10 participation payment. This payment will be split in
two and mailed to you at two di↵erent dates. You will be mailed $5 in one
week and another $5 in four weeks. These payments are independent of any
other payments you receive from this experiment.
In this study, you will complete 29 di↵erent Tasks. Each task asks you to
make a series of decisions between two options, OPTION A and OPTION B.
The di↵erent options provide di↵erent values of payments sooner, mailed in
one week, and later, mailed in four weeks. For each decision, all you have to
do is decide whether you prefer OPTION A or OPTION B.
It is important to note that the payments in this study may involve chance.
There may be a chance that your sooner payment, your later payment or both
will not be sent at all. For each decision, you will be fully informed of the
chance involved for the sooner and later payments. You will also always be
fully informed about how each chance will be determined for each Task and
each Decision. Whether or not your payments will be sent will be determined
at the END of the experiment today.
Once all decisions have been made, we will randomly select one task and
one decision as the decision-that-counts. This will be done in two stages.
First, we will pick a number from 1 to 29 at random to determine which is the
task-that-counts. Then we will pick a second number at random from 1 to 30
to determine which decision in the task-that-counts will be the decision-that-
counts. We will use your choice in the decision-that-counts to determine your
actual earnings.
Note, since all decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should make each
decision as if it will be the decision-that-counts.
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IMPORTANT: All payments will be sent to your mailing address. On the
scheduled day, a check will be placed for delivery with the United States Postal
Service by Professor Sprenger and his assistants.
As a reminder to you, the day before you are scheduled to be mailed one
of your payments, we will send you an e-mail notifying you that the payment
will be sent. On your desk is a business card for Professor Sprenger with his
contact information. Please keep this in a safe place. If one of your payments
is not received you should immediately contact Professor Sprenger, and we will
hand-deliver payment to you.
Your Identity: In order to receive payment, we will need to collect your
name, mailing address and email address. This information will only be
seen by Professor Sprenger and his assistants. As soon as your payments are
registered today, the link between the choices you make and your payments
will be destroyed. Your identity will not be a part of any subsequent data
analysis. You have, instead, received an anonymous participant number on the
card on your desk that we will use for analysis.
On your desk are two envelopes: one for the sooner payment and one for
the later payment. Please take the time now to address them to yourself at
your preferred mailing address. You will note that the participant number is
written on both envelopes. Once your payments are registered today, we will
erase this number on the envelope, destroying the link between your choices
and your payments.
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How it Works:
In this study you will complete 29 Tasks. Each task asks you to make 30
decisions between two options. The first option will always be called OPTION
A. The second option will always be called OPTION B. Each decision you
make is a choice. For each decision, all you have to do is decide whether you
prefer OPTION A or OPTION B.
Throughout the tasks, either OPTION A, OPTION B or both will involve
chance. You will be fully informed of the chances involved for every decision.
For this study, choices will be between various chances of a positive amount or
zero. Options may have more than one chance of receiving a positive amount.
Once we know which is the decision-that-counts, and whether you prefer
OPTION A or OPTION B, we will then determine the value of your payments.
If you prefer OPTION A in the decision-that-counts, then OPTION A will be
implemented. If you prefer OPTION B, then OPTION B will be implemented.
For example, consider the following two OPTIONS:
EXAMPLE
Option A or Option B
$10 in a week $20 in 4 weeks $20 in a week $20 in 4 weeks
Chance 1 Chance 2 Chance 1 Chance 2
1) 70 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 35 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
if you prefer Option A, check the green box...
1) 70 in 100 90 in 100 2  or 35 in 100 90 in 100 2
Chance Chance Chance Chance
if you prefer Option B, check the blue box...
1) 70 in 100 90 in 100 2 or 35 in 100 90 in 100 2 
Chance Chance Chance Chance
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If this was chosen as the decision-that-counts, four pairs of ten-sided dice
would be rolled. One pair of dice would be rolled for Chance 1 of Option A,
one pair for Chance 2 of Option A, one pair for Chance 1 of Option B, and
one pair for Chance 2 of Option B. The rolls of these dice will determine the
values of payments mailed in one week and in four weeks for those preferring
Option A and those preferring Option B.
For each pair of dice, the first roll will correspond to the ten’s digit, while
the second roll will determine the one’s digit. For example, rolling a 7 and
then a 3 would mean rolling a 73. Rolling 0-0 will count as 100. If the chance
of receiving a given amount is greater than or equal to the rolled number, then
the corresponding amount will be mailed at the given date in addition to the
$5 participation payment. If the chance of receiving a given amount is lower
than the rolled number, the corresponding amount would not be sent and only
the $5 participation payment would be mailed. For example, if the chance of
receiving a given payment was 90 in 100, any dice roll from 0-1 to 9-0 will
result in the payment being sent, while any dice roll from 9-1 to 0-0 will result
in the payment not being sent.
In the example above, if you preferred OPTION B we would roll two pairs
of dice for Chance 1 and Chance 2. If the pair for Chance 1 read 4-7 and the
pair for Chance 2 read 6-5, what payments would be mailed (don’t forget your
participation payments)?
For Chance 1 you have a 35 in 100 chance of receiving $20 in one week.
Because 47 is larger than 35, the $20 would not be received and you would be
mailed $0 + $5 participation payment = $5 in one week. For Chance 2 you
have a 90 in 100 chance of receiving $20 in four weeks. Because 65 is smaller
than or equal to 90, the $20 would be received and you would be mailed $20
20
+ $5 participation payment = $25 in four weeks.
In the example above, if you preferred OPTION A we would roll two pairs
of dice for Chance 1 and Chance 2. If the pair for Chance 1 read 6-8 and the
pair for Chance 2 read 9-8, what payments would be mailed (don’t forget your
participation payments)?
In one week: enter here In four weeks:
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Things to Remember:
• You must have a valid mailing address.
• You will receive your payment for this study by mail.
• You will receive a $10 participation payment. This payment will be split
in two. $5 will be mailed in one week. $5 will be mailed in four weeks.
These payments are independent of the choices you make today.
• You will complete 29 tasks.
• Each task asks you to complete a series of decisions between OPTION A
and OPTION B. The di↵erent options provide di↵erent values of payments
sooner, mailed in one week, and later, mailed in four weeks. All you have
to do is state whether you prefer OPTION A or OPTION B.
• In each task OPTION A, OPTION B or both may involve chance. You
will be fully informed of the chances for each option.
• Options may have more than once chance of receiving a positive amount.
• Once all of your decisions have been made, we will choose one task and one
decision as the decision-that-counts and will implement your preferred
option.
• Every decision is equally likely to be the decision-that-counts. So, it is in
your interest to treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines
your payments.
• For the decision-that-counts, your payments may be determined by chance
through the roll of four pairs of ten-sided dice. If a given chance payment
will not be received, you will only receive the $5 participation payment on
the given date.
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